A new two-party bargaining mechanism

作者: Y. H. Gu , M. Goh , Q. L. Chen , R. D. Souza , G. C. Tang

DOI: 10.1007/S10878-011-9424-0

关键词: MicroeconomicsSolution setBargaining powerBargaining problemEfficient frontierComputer scienceFinancial crisisProfit (economics)Mathematical optimizationPareto principleOptimization problem

摘要: If resources and facilities from different partners need to be engaged for a large-scale project with huge number of tasks, any which is indivisible, decision on the tasks assigned collaborating partner often requires certain amount coordination bargaining among these so that ultimate task allocation can accepted by in business union project. In current global financial crisis, such cases may appear frequently. this paper, we first investigate behavior discrete model faced service-based organizations. particular, address general situation two partners, where finite Pareto efficient (profit allocation) set does not possess convenient assumption deriving solution, namely final profit (corresponding assignment) acceptable both partners. We show it appropriate our offer only one allocation. Modifying original optimization problem used derive Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), develop mechanism define related solution fulfil type needs balance between profit-earning efficiency fairness. then also suit Nash's concave its continuous extension without concavity frontier

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