Matching spatial property rights fisheries with scales of fish dispersal

摘要: Regulation of fisheries using spatial property rights can alleviate competition for high-value patches that hinders economic efficiency in quota-based, rights-based, and open-access management programs. However, gains erode when delineation constitutes incomplete ownership the resource, thereby degrading its local value promoting overexploitation. Incomplete may be particularly prevalent mobile fishery species. We developed a game-theoretic bioeconomic model representing territorial user (TURF) nearshore marine fish invertebrate species with adult larval life history stages. Strategic responses by neighboring units result overexploitation stock reduced yields each compared those attainable without resource mobility or coordination sole control fishing effort. High dispersal potential stage, common trait among species, coupled scaling to only capture mobility, characteristic many TURF programs, particular substantially levels yields. In case study hypothetical programs needed tens kilometers alongshore length minimize export generate reasonable returns fisheries. Cooperation quota regulations represent solutions problem need quantified cost integrated into determination acceptability