Competitive politics, simplified heuristics, and preferences for public goods

作者: Felix Schläpfer , Marcel Schmitt , Anna Roschewitz

DOI: 10.1016/J.ECOLECON.2007.08.008

关键词: CredibilityBounded rationalityVotingHeuristicsEconomicsPublic goodContingent valuationPublic economicsRespondentControl (management)

摘要: Abstract This paper examines the role of simplified heuristics in formation preferences for public goods. Political scientists have suggested that voters use based on positions familiar parties to infer how a proposed policy will affect them and cast vote line with their interests values. Here, we two-stage field-survey experiment investigate knowledge party affects choices. We followed standard procedures developing an attribute-based choice alternative land-use policies Switzerland. In contrast usual formulation, however, hypothetical costs were formulated as percentage change taxes. The benefit this formulation relative absolute money amounts is credibility (hypothetical) respondents does not depend respondent income. Furthermore, allowed us solicit policies. Six out eight contacted provided positions. then conducted split-sample mail survey where included table subsample questionnaires. report six main experimental results. (1) response rate was unaffected by (2) proportion no-choice answers decreased forty percent control. (3) information significantly affected choices directly interaction respondents' general attitudes towards spending nature landscape conservation thus way individuals mapped from specific (4) interacted educational level only sets, suggesting even more educated relied heuristics. (5) Respondents who knew sensitive tax attribute. (6) For medium higher bills, resulting willingness-to-pay estimates factor two ten These findings suggest helped articulate consistent than treatment without information.

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