An Efficient and Egalitarian Negotiation Procedure for Economies with Externalities
作者： Nicolás Porteiro
DOI: 10.1007/S00355-006-0156-5
关键词:
摘要: We construct a simple mechanism that can be used in situations when group of well informed agents try to cooperate the production and allocation good with external effects. start by auctioning right have initiative negotiation, then winner proposes an is implemented if rest players unanimously accept it. In case rejection, process started again. show outcome any stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium leads efficient externalities, together equal split surplus cooperation generates.
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