作者: J. Atsu Amegashie , J. Atsu Amegashie
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摘要: In psychological games, higher-order beliefs, emotions, and motives - in addition to actions affect players' payoffs. Suppose you are invited a party, movie, dinner, etc not because your company is desired but the inviter would feel guilty if she did invite you. all of these cases, it conceivable that intention behind action will matter hence I show this social interaction game. However, under certain conditions, special case games with interdependent preference types as studied Gul Pesendorfer (2005). find complex particular, there exists unique equilibrium which player may stick strategy accepting every invitation goal discouraging insincere invitations. This lead one erroneously infer eagerly waiting for an invitation, when indeed his behavior driven more by strategic considerations than excessive desire acceptance. The discussion shows while can capture phenomena seek address, intuition, motivation, or explanation same phenomenon be different. discuss how being tolerated truly accepted explain rejection mutually beneficial trades, choice identity, exclusion, marital divorce, political correctness.