作者: Andrew E.F. Burgess , Tommaso Lorenzi , Pietà G. Schofield , Stephen F. Hubbard , Mark A.J. Chaplain
DOI: 10.1016/J.JTBI.2017.02.028
关键词: Spatial clustering 、 Movement (music) 、 Ecology 、 Mathematical economics 、 Normal-form game 、 Computer science 、 Game theory 、 Imitation 、 Dilemma 、 Prisoner's dilemma 、 Semiochemical
摘要: The emergence of cooperation is a major conundrum evolutionary biology. To unravel this riddle, several models have been developed within the theoretical framework spatial game theory, focussing on interactions between two general classes player, "cooperators" and "defectors". Generally, explicit movement in domain not considered these models, with strategies moving via imitation or through colonisation neighbouring sites. We present here spatially stochastic individual-based model which pure cooperators defectors undergo random motion diffusion also chemotaxis guided by gradient semiochemical. Individual rules are derived from an underlying system reaction-diffusion-taxis partial differential equations describes dynamics local number individuals concentration Local governed payoff matrix classical prisoner's dilemma, accumulated payoffs translated into offspring. investigate cases both synchronous non-synchronous generations. Focussing ecological scenario where parasitic cooperators, we find that semiochemical sensing bring about self-generated patterns resident can coexist proportions fluctuate non-zero values. Remarkably, coexistence emerges as genuine consequence natural tendency to aggregate clusters, without need for them physical shelter outrun defectors. This provides further evidence clustering enhances benefits mutual plays crucial role preserving cooperative behaviours.