Ownership Redirection in Franchised Channels
作者： Rajiv P Dant , Patrick J Kaufmann , Audhesh K Paswan
DOI: 10.1177/074391569201100104
关键词: Competitor analysis 、 Franchise 、 Business 、 Industrial organization
摘要: Since the typical franchise arrangements permit the more powerful franchisors to simultaneously act as suppliers as well as competitors to their franchisees, apprehensions …
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