Understanding contracts in evolving agro-economies: Fermers, dekhqans and networks in Khorezm, Uzbekistan

作者: Utkur Djanibekov , Kristof Van Assche , Daan Boezeman , Nodir Djanibekov

DOI: 10.1016/J.JRURSTUD.2013.05.003

关键词: Corporate governanceConstitutionActantEconomicsInstitutional economicsContext (language use)EconomyPrincipal (computer security)InterdependenceMoral hazardGeography, Planning and DevelopmentDevelopment (topology)Sociology and Political Science

摘要: We combine institutional economic perspectives and actor-network theory to elucidate the role of contracts in evolution transitional agricultural systems. Such combination theories can shed a light on mutual constitution actors institutions, formation strategies. argue that forms functions only be understood an evolutionary context. In case study Khorezm region, Uzbekistan, where several waves reform created two principal - commercial farms (called fermers locally) responsible for state-ordered production semi-subsistence smallholders dekhqans it is demonstrated how self-transformation actor-network, thus shifts roles contracts, network features play role: interdependencies between actors, essential actant irrigation drainage system, formal/informal dialectics. Time horizons, risk/benefit calculations, trust cooperation emerge self-reproducing leave space certain contractual functions. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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