作者: ASTRID ZABEL , KARIN HOLM-MÜLLER
DOI: 10.1111/J.1523-1739.2008.00898.X
关键词: Moral hazard 、 Business 、 Livelihood 、 Agricultural land 、 Natural resource economics 、 Transparency (market) 、 Population 、 Carnivore 、 Livestock 、 Environmental protection 、 Wildlife
摘要: Many carnivores require vast territories, and as human population increases, more pristine natural areas are being developed converted into agricultural land. Unsurprisingly, that live at the fringe between wild land occasionally prey on livestock. Predation of livestock can result in severe economic losses (Mishra 1997; Thirgood et al. 2005; Woodroffe 2005). Herders, whose livelihoods depend livestock, often seek to kill predators prevent further damage. Conservationists, other hand, engage measures protect endangered because they appreciated an important component biodiversity. Viable solutions make coexistence wildlife acceptable conservationists owners much needed likely be increasingly sought after sprawl increases. Schemes provide ex post compensation for predation have been implemented many places around world, but not proven widely successful. Most schemes’ deficiencies ascribed one or several following problems: moral hazard (Cozza 1996; Swenson & Andren 2005), high transaction costs (Saberwal 1994; Blanco 2003), long time lags (Fourli 1999; Madhusudan problems trust transparency (Montag 2002; Western Waithaka Mainly due these problems, practitioners analysts denounced schemes inadequate, fraudulent, cumbersome (Naughton-Treves 2003). Drawing empirical insights a conservation performance-payment scheme Sweden, we