Review of gate-level differential power analysis and fault analysis countermeasures

作者: Hamad Marzouqi , Mahmoud Al-Qutayri , Khaled Salah

DOI: 10.1049/IET-IFS.2012.0319

关键词: CryptosystemEngineering design processPower analysisLeakage (electronics)Computer scienceSide channel attackEmbedded systemCryptographyForcing (recursion theory)Cryptanalysis

摘要: Hardware implementation of modern crypto devices paves the way for a special type cryptanalysis, which is known as side channel analysis (SCA) attacks. These attacks are designed to extract critical information from physical leakage digital circuitry such power consumption and electromagnetic emissions. Differential (DPA) considered most efficient form SCA that require types countermeasures. Another attacks, fault (FA), based on forcing circuit produce faulty results in order useful about secret. Several countermeasures have been proposed literature address mitigate at different levels abstraction. They include algorithmic, gate transistor-level Leakage originates every level according implemented system attack methodology. Countermeasures transistor more generic than those algorithmic they tend be specialised certain implementations. Complication design process increases down basic abstraction layers, however, gate-level provide balance generality complication. The major state-of-the-art against DPA FA reviewed here.

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