Is human learning rational

作者: David R. Shanks

DOI: 10.1080/14640749508401390

关键词: PsychologyHuman learningSocial psychologyAssociative propertyCognitive scienceControl (linguistics)Associative learning

摘要: We can predict and control events in the world via associative learning. Such learning is rational if we come to believe that an relationship exists between a pair of only when i...

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